With over 14 million people displaced, the world’s largest humanitarian crisis is currently taking place in Sudan. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (“Burhan”), leader of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF, i.e. the national army); and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, have vested interests in the continuation of conflict, and were this larger one to settle, there would likely be other domestic conflicts with armed groups in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile which have not taken a side in this war. Additionally, the current conflict has seen the formation of a coalition of militias that have joined with either the SAF or RSF.
The international community must therefore seek concertedly to secure a lasting ceasefire, and to bring an end to this war in such a way that neither Burhan nor Hemedti is in a position to play a role in the country’s future governance. There have been moments in recent history when the international community has fallen for compromises that appeared to offer stability in the short-term, for example the civilian-led transitional government that gave both Burhan and Hemedti prominent positions in a power sharing Sovereign Council following the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, only for their October 2021 coup to remove civilian leaders and effectively install a military-controlled government, which has been in place since then. The only path toward a viable and stable future for Sudan is through an unencumbered civilian leadership.
While the European Union (EU) prefers to defer to the African Union (AU) on the Sudan crisis, given the political positioning of AU members, the viability of its role as a mediator is limited. AU member states which were effective in negotiating a settlement with civilians in 2019 are now divided. Ethiopia, which led on the negotiations, is dealing with its own internal conflicts and looming regional ones, including the possibility of renewed hostilities with Eritrea, its former ally against the Tigray region which still occupies part of that area and is allegedly supportive of insurgents in the Amhara region. Egypt, a member of both the AU and Arab States, has at times pursued interests that have frustrated AU states. The EU therefore needs to play an active role, and there are two actions it should immediately consider.
Despite what is popularly thought, targeted sanctions are not about accountability or punishment (as if travel bans and the freezing of assets would constitute sufficient retributive justice for war crimes!). Rather, they are about creating a negative incentive to encourage a change of behaviour. This means that the party imposing sanctions needs to be clear about precisely what changes in behaviour are expected from the sanctioned individuals or entities, offering a clear roadmap for compliance.
With sanctions acting as a negative diplomatic inducement, the EU should also consider a positive diplomatic inducement. While the suggestion will be extremely difficult to stomach, one diplomatic criticism of the global engagement on the civilian-led transition was the lack of a concerted plan for the military and paramilitary leaders to hand power and economic control over to a civilian-led state. These leaders had amassed personal wealth and business interests due to being in a position to form and exploit the resources of Sudan. As part of any negotiations to bring the war to an end, the international community may need to consider “exit strategies” for both men. Again, this is not about permanent impunity or rewarding crimes, but about the international community doing what it can to leverage Sudan toward peace and a civilian-led future as soon as possible. This consideration may be more urgent as the current US administration takes a more transactional approach to relations in the region.
In January, during the final days of the Biden presidency, the US government imposed targeted sanctions on both Burhan and Hemedti, and on some associated entities (including RSF funders in the UAE). This move came as a positive surprise to many Sudan watchers, and its diplomatic effects were soon evident. One example of this was the Kenyan government’s cancellation (only days after US sanctions) of a speaking platform that had been made available to Hemedti in Nairobi, without explanation.
However, in February the RSF held a press conference in Nairobi announcing a its parallel government, in the presence of individuals at the top of the armed groups that are subject to international sanctions. At this meeting the RSF also announced the participation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North – Al Hilu with the presence of the group’s leader in the parallel government, extending the geographic reach of RSF-controlled areas. The Kenyan government in turn has been accused of showing hostility towards the SAF by picking a side in the conflict.
Another reason why Nairobi may have allowed this significant meeting to take place after cancelling an RSF event earlier in the year may have been the shift in policy in Washington DC with the executive order imposing sanctions on the staff at the International Criminal Court. The reluctance of the Ruto administration to be seen so closely aligned with a genocidal militia in January yet providing a venue for the announcement of a parallel government in February shows the importance of unequivocal support for mechanisms of accountability within the international legal order.
It is time for the EU to follow the Biden administration’s example regarding sanctions – particularly as the Trump administration may choose a different path. The EU’s current choice to not sanction Hemedti and Burhan seems to be part of its goal to act as a “trusted convening platform” for civil society – and it does not seem to be making use of “high-level channels” in any other way. While these efforts are commendable, they do not outweigh the relative impact, compared with the leverage that targeted sanctions would bring. Having these sanctions in place may assist in disqualifying both individuals from playing a role in the country’s governance in the future; and will also give the EU a degree of leverage in determining the conditions – whatever they eventually look like.
By CSW’s Senior EU Advocate Jonathan de Leyser