In April this year the Vietnamese government formally introduced sweeping reforms during the 11th Plenum of the 13th Party Central Committee. The meeting laid the groundwork for the restructuring plan, which was later affirmed at the first Congress of the Government Party Organisation for the 2025–2030 tenure held on 13 October.
At the April plenum, Party General Secretary Tô Lâm described the reforms as part of a long-term vision for national development, stating: ‘The restructure is a strategic decision without precedent, aimed at ensuring fast, stable, and sustainable national development, and at better serving the lives of the people.’
The reforms have been hailed by officials as a bold step toward modernisation and efficiency, but behind the rhetoric of ‘streamlining’, human rights advocates warn that these changes may deepen state control, restrict freedoms further, and marginalise vulnerable communities—most of whom are ethnic and religious minorities.
A consolidation of power
Under the restructuring, two ministries, the Committee for Ethnic and Minority Affairs and the Committee for Religious Affairs, have been combined to form the Ministry of Ethnic Minority and Religious Affairs. This was presented as a way to improve coordination between branches of government that often overlap. In practice, critics fear it consolidates state power over two of the most sensitive areas: ethnic identity and religious practice.
Vietnam’s Law on Belief and Religion already imposes onerous registration requirements on religious groups, leaving unregistered communities—often ethnic minorities—vulnerable to harassment, violence and imprisonment. Those that do register face requirements to arbitrarily report to the government that could compromise the privacy of congregants and even what messages clergy can preach on.
The new ministry could tighten this grip, making it harder for independent religious actors to operate outside state-sanctioned frameworks and further restricting the freedoms already registered religious groups must adhere to practice and remain on good terms with this new government body.
Meanwhile, Articles 117 and 331 of Vietnam’s Penal Code continue to criminalise ‘making, storing, distributing, or disseminating information, documents, or items against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’, often interpreted as anti-state propaganda, and ‘abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the State’, respectively. These broadly worded provisions are frequently used to silence dissent and restrict free expression,and recent arrests of Khmer Krom monks and Protestant pastors underscore the risk that restructuring will not bring greater freedom, but rather more systematic repression under a centralised bureaucracy – out of the frying pan and into the fire, so to speak.
A removal of accountability
Before the 2025 reforms, Vietnam’s administrative system was structured into 63 provinces and centrally governed cities, each subdivided into districts, which in turn were broken down into communes and wards. This three-tier hierarchy—province, district, commune—was designed to maintain local governance and ensure state presence even in remote areas. However, the system was often criticised for inefficiency, overlapping responsibilities, and bloated bureaucracy.
Vietnam has now dramatically simplified this structure. The number of provinces and cities has been almost halved, from 63 to 34, through large-scale mergers aimed at creating stronger regional units. More radically, the district level has been abolished entirely, leaving only two tiers: provincial and commune. This change is intended to streamline governance, reduce administrative costs and accelerate digital transformation. While officials tout efficiency gains, critics argue that removing district-level representation could weaken local accountability and make it harder for citizens—especially in rural and minority areas—to access government services or challenge abuses.
Even before the restructuring, Vietnam’s governance model was already highly authoritarian, with no independent judiciary, media or civil society organisations allowed. Removing intermediate layers of local government could further weaken accountability and make it harder for citizens—especially in rural and minority regions—to seek redress for abuse
This matters because Vietnam has a documented history of targeting those who challenge local officials. In April 2025 Human Rights Watch reported on how Article 331 has become a “handy tool” for silencing dissent and punishing ordinary citizens who complain about corruption or land seizures, with at least 124 people were convicted under this law between 2018 and early 2025.
In a system where criticism is criminalised, concentrating power at the provincial level risks amplifying repression rather than reducing inefficiency.
A pattern of repression, not reform
The restructuring also coincides with an intensifying crackdown on freedom of religion or belief. Unregistered religious groups—often Montagnards, Hmong Christians and Khmer Krom Buddhists—face harassment, denial of services and even physical attacks. There is a real concern that the new ministry could institutionalise these discriminatory practices under the banner of ‘management’. Draft decrees on religion published in recent years already signal a trend toward stricter control, including fines and shutdowns for non-compliant groups.
The arrests of religious leaders under Articles 117 and 331, including a Protestant pastor in January 2025, highlight how Vietnam conflates peaceful religious activity with ‘anti-state propaganda’. These laws violate Vietnam’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), yet remain central to its legal arsenal against dissent.
Again, Human Rights Watch paints a grim picture: Vietnam is among Southeast Asia’s most repressive states, with over 170 activists and bloggers serving prison sentences by the end of 2024. The rise of General Secretary Tô Lâm—formerly head of the Ministry of Public Security—signals a strongarmed, security-first approach to governance. Far from liberalising, Vietnam has doubled down on censorship, surveillance and punitive laws targeting free expression and association.
International partners eager to deepen trade ties should take note. As HRW warns, economic engagement without human rights conditionality risks legitimising authoritarian consolidation. Many civil society organisations also share CSW’s belief that Vietnam’s recently renewed membership in the UN Human Rights Council is at odds with its domestic reality.
Vietnam’s 2025 restructuring may reduce administrative costs, but it also centralises power in ways that threaten civil liberties. For ethnic minorities, religious communities, and activists, the reforms could mean fewer avenues for justice and greater exposure to state repression.
Efficiency should never come at the expense of fundamental rights—but in Vietnam, that trade-off appears to be exactly what’s happening.
By CSW’s Research and Advocacy Officer for Vietnam