Until 3 January 2026, Nicolás Maduro sat as the head of the Venezuelan government. He derived much, if not all, of his legitimacy because he was handpicked as successor by the late president, Hugo Chávez, with the approval of the then leader of Cuba, Raul Castro. This superseded the normal chain of succession, under which Diosdado Cabello, as head of the National Assembly, should have assumed the presidency until elections could be held.
At the time, speculation was rampant about possible divisions within Chávez’s inner circle, and the possibility that Cabello might make a power grab of his own. However, Cabello, and other powerful Chávez loyalists, including General Vladimir Padrino, publicly accepted Chávez’s choice, allowing Maduro to ascend to the presidency.
The result was what has been widely, and misleadingly, referred to as ‘the Maduro Regime’, but, which, in truth, is a Chavista regime – set up strategically and intentionally with a cast of key players, to ensure that the Chavista party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) remains in power indefinitely. Over the past 13 years, members of this cast of players have supported Maduro’s position even as they consolidated power and massive wealth for themselves.
A comparison can be made to Cuba. In the 2000s many, including many Cubans, assumed that the rule of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) would come to an end, or at least be significantly weakened by the death of Fidel Castro. Instead, he set up a plan to ensure stability in the longer term, handing power over to his brother Raul. Even then, many assumed that the Castro family was interested in setting up a dynasty – and with no clear heir apparent, the hope was, that with the eventual aging out or death of Raul Castro, the power structure would fall apart.
In 2019, however, another orchestrated transition of power began, placing Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermudez as president, and then in 2021 expanding his remit to include the position of First Secretary of the CCP. The CCP remains entrenched in power, despite a dire economic situation and failing critical infrastructure, and has rejected any suggestion of political or social reform.
Under Maduro’s leadership, the Venezuelan government was never a totalitarian dictatorship in the classic sense, built around one individual or family, but a complex structure set up deliberately and strategically to ensure the continuity of the Chavista system, just as the Castro system has rolled on even in the absence of any significant Castro family members in visible top leadership positions.
Cuba and Venezuela are governed under systems built to last, irrespective of the surname of the individual who appears at the top of the power structure, in contrast to, for example, the Kim dynasty in North Korea.
The systems and economies of Cuba and Venezuela have been intricately linked since the 2000s, beginning under the leaderships of Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro. Cuba has provided Venezuela not just with military and intelligence support but has also provided personnel to be integrated into and to help reshape Venezuela’s institutions. The military was purged, and purged again, of anyone suspected of any degree of disloyalty to the Chavista government and the PSUV. Armed groups of Chavista militants, called ‘colectivos’ were set up across the country, at every level – in urban neighborhoods, towns and villages as brute enforcers of Chavista policies.
Cuba’s systematic use of civilian informants was also applied, but with a 21st century twist. The Chavista government promoted the use of an app through which citizens were encouraged to use their mobile phones to report on their neighbors or anyone else they suspected of ‘disruptive’ anti-government activity.
A full dismantling of the Chavista system will be extremely challenging, and could leave significant power vacuums in institutional sectors and geographic parts of the country, generating increased instability. Even with the forcible removal of Maduro, key power figures remain in place in Venezuela at the national level, including Cabello, Padrino, former vice-president and now acting president Delcy Rodríguez, and her brother Jorge Rodríguez, the president of Venezuela’s National Assembly. Chavista also power extends to the state and local levels; the PSUV holds power in 23 of 25 Venezuelan states and 90% of its municipalities.
All of this is supported by the military, paramilitary and intelligence apparatuses that have benefited from from Chavismo and are tasked with defending their position and the system that allows them to keep it. Cuba also has a vested interest in keeping the Chavista system in place. The CCP has relied on Venezuela to keep it afloat – with Venezuelan and Mexican oil subsidies used to prop up its failing power infrastructure – and will likely do whatever it can to maintain the status quo.
Given these dynamics, along with uncertainty and mixed messages from the United States government about its planned next steps, the long-term implications for democracy and human rights, including freedom of religion or belief are unclear.
What is clear, however, is that the Chavista government does not seem to be looking to make concessions in this area. Within a day or two of Maduro’s ouster, the colectivos were activated across the country to shut down any hint of protests. They set up roadblocks and went door to door, interrogating those they found and reviewing their devices for any social media activity that might indicate support for the removal of Maduro.
In a situation as tense and uncertain as that in which Venezuela finds itself today, Chavista militants, at every level, will be looking for any sign of dissent or disloyalty. Religious leaders, because of the influence they hold in the communities in which they work and in some cases their ability to gather and speak to large groups of people, are likely to be of particular interest to those seeking to keep the Chavistas in power. They will be acutely aware of the history of antagonism between the Chavista government and some religious leaders, especially from the Catholic Church, who have expressed criticism of the actions and policies of those in power in the past.
Leaders of all religious groups, especially those who have not proclaimed allegiance publicly to the Chavista government, will know that their sermons, public prayers and any other statements they make are likely to be scrutinised. They can take the presence of informants in their congregations as a given. In this area, too, the Chavista system has followed a Cuban model – attacking religious leaders who are openly critical of it or its policies and fomenting division, by setting up programmes that privilege religious groups willing to publicly express support for the regime. These divisions are set to become even starker. There will be increased pressure even on religious leaders who have thus far attempted to remain neutral, or apolitical, to make it clear, and public, where their loyalties lie.
Adding to the complexity is the now entrenched presence of the National Liberation Army (ELN), a 60-yearold Colombian guerrilla group with a significant presence in Venezuela. The far-left insurgent group has a long record of severely restricting freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) in areas under its control or influence in Colombia, viewing Protestants, who they consider to be ‘agents of imperialism’ because of historic links of some to North American missionaries, with particular hostility.
Over more than a decade, during which time its number of active fighters quadrupled (from an estimated 1500 in 2013 to approximately 6000 in 2025), the ELN has been provided safe haven inside Venezuela. In return, it has worked actively with Chavista government forces to secure strategic parts of the and country and helped to ensure ‘correct’ results of elections and the elimination of civil dissent.
The ELN is present and active far into the Venezuelan interior including in the Orinoco Mining Arc, and effectively runs a number of municipalities in border states, where it has imposed its own rules on local populations, including rural communities, schools and religious institutions. In some cases, it has pushed out the colectivos and established de facto military control. It, and other illegal armed groups, has reportedly employed the use of drones to carry out constant surveillance of those living there. Religious leaders in these areas have been intimidated and coerced, under explicit threats of violence, into complying with the ELN rules. Many are required to notify the ELN before conducting pastoral activities, including community outreach or any visits involving international organisations.
Inside Venezuela, the ELN has applied similar policies towards Protestant religious groups to those it is known for in Colombia. Under the ELN rules, religious leaders are barred from addressing certain topics publicly, including during religious services or community activities. These topics include extortion, kidnapping, human rights, women’s empowerment and migration. Some have been barred from using social media and speaking to the the press or human rights groups, limiting their ability to communicate community needs or report abuses.
The US’ actions will likely embolden ELN idealogues, confirming and feeding the anti-imperialist narrative on which they have long relied. They are also unlikely to be enthusiastic about losing Venezuela as a base from which to operate, and, if further political destabilisation develops, could widen their military actions into Venezuela to protect their interests. This would have devastating consequences for the civilian population and would likely result in widespread and serious human violations, including violations of FoRB.
While much uncertainty surrounds US plans in regard to Venezuela and how far regime change is likely to extend, there is no doubt that the situation at every level is extremely tense and will probably continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Religious leaders will find themselves in an especially visible and precarious position, with their communities looking to them for reassurance and guidance, even as the eyes and ears of the Chavista government will be trained on them, on the watch for any perceived indication of disloyalty. For many, remaining faithful to the principles of their respective religion and continuing to fulfil their roles as leaders, without attracting the ire of the Chavistas, will involve an often considerable degree of risk.
By CSW’s Director of Advocacy and Americas Team Leader Anna Lee Stangl