In late March the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) claimed a significant victory. After months of fighting, the army declared that it had seized full control of the Sudanese capital Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.
Visiting the presidential palace for the first time since conflict broke out between the two forces almost two years ago, the leader of the SAF Abdel Fattah al-Burhan said, ‘Khartoum is free, it’s done.’
Some residents of the city may have even breathed a small sigh of relief. While both the RSF and SAF stand accused of the gravest of international crimes, it is generally accepted that conditions are marginally better in areas under SAF rule, perhaps because it is the party to the conflict that currently occupies Sudan’s seat in international arenas.
But the country’s nightmare is far from over.
On 26 March RSF soldiers were seen leaving the capital; however, fighting has intensified in other cities. On 30 March the RSF attacked the Sudan Church of Christ building in Dar Elsalam Ombada, in Sudan’s second city, Omdurman. Before looting the church, they physically attacked, harassed and intimidated those in the building, and one of the church elders was hit with the back of a gun.
As in Khartoum and in Gezira State, which it essentially lost to the SAF in January, the RSF stands accused of committing severe atrocities in Darfur, including sexual and gender-based violence and the intentional targeting of the ethnic Masalit and other non-Arab communities.
The RSF has focused much of its military operations on taking El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State, which has been under siege since April 2024. In December, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that at least 782 civilians had been killed and over 1,100 had been injured in the ongoing siege, and that there were no guarantees of safe passage out of the city. Most recently, in April reports emerged of the killing of more than 200 civilians in a wave of attacks on displacement camps, including the murders of medical staff and humanitarian workers in the last remaining clinic in Zamzam displacement camp.
The militia also appears to have no intention of leaving Khartoum, or indeed any part of Sudan, to the SAF. Speaking in an audio message shared on Telegram shortly after the RSF’s retreat from the capital, its leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as ‘Hemedti’, claimed that the withdrawal was a ‘collective’ and ‘tactical’ decision made by the RSF leadership, pledging to return to Khartoum ‘stronger, more powerful and victorious’ and declaring the RSF had ‘neither agreement nor discussion with [the SAF] – only the language of arms’.
Meanwhile, highly concerning and credible reports have emerged of widespread extrajudicial executions of civilians in Khartoum following the SAF takeover, with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk alleging that those killed were targeted on suspicion of collaborating with the RSF.
Such reports are consistent with others that have emerged throughout the course of the conflict. Both the RSF and SAF view anyone who comes from an area under their opponents’ control as a potential collaborator, in some cases extracting confessions under torture to support this, or simply resolving any doubt or discussion by execution.
The situation is exacerbated further by the myriad armed groups and militias that fight alongside each force. These groups – among them the notorious Al-Bara ibn Malik Brigade, a self-described jihadist group allied with the SAF, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which controls large portions of the Nuba Mountains and is allied with the RSF – have competing interests of their own, and may expand the scope of the conflict even if the RSF and SAF were to agree to a ceasefire – which is itself unlikely.
Rising tensions in South Sudan – where President Salva Kiir has breached the country’s peace agreement by placing Vice-President Riek Machar under house arrest – could also have a spillover effect. The SAF has accused South Sudan of supporting the RSF and recently claimed the country was responsible for harbouring ‘traitors’. A return to open conflict in the country could also have particularly profound implications for civilians in the neighbouring Nuba Mountains, where many have retreated and for which supply chains through South Sudan provide a lifeline.
These factors and others could severely exacerbate what is already the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, and a conflict that has claimed the lives of over 150,000 people and displaced over 12 million others.
The international community must act decisively. Responding urgently to the humanitarian need is a priority, and justice, accountability, and the protection of civilians must be a part of this response. States should impose co-ordinated and targeted sanctions on both Burhan and Hemedti, as well as on others that continue to fund and support the conflict’s various armed actors. They must also ensure that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is adequately resourced and supported to investigate ongoing violations in Darfur, and that its mandate is ultimately extended to the investigation of international crimes committed across the whole of Sudan.
By CSW’s Press & Public Affairs Officer Ellis Heasley