The Cuban Family Code two years on

22 July 2024 marked two years since the Cuban Family Code was approved by the National Assembly, and, just as CSW warned, the legislation has extended far beyond equality for the LGBT+ community. Although this aspect was the focus of the government’s efforts to encourage a ‘yes’ vote in the public referendum that followed, only a handful of the 474 articles were relevant to that subject.

Implementation of the legislation has pressured entire families into emigrating, to protect their children and not lose parental custody as is a real possibility under Article 191 of the code. The legislation allows for minors to be transferred into the care of the state, if the parents fail to fulfil the responsibilities detailed in Article 138 of the code including ‘inculcating love for the family, for the homeland, respect for its symbols… the norms of social coexistence [based on the ideology of the Cuban Communist Party] and respect for the authorities’.   Parents are at risk if they demonstrate behaviour that ‘induces their daughter or son to commit a criminal act…’ (191 (c)) and/or ‘[are responsible for] vicious, corrupt or criminal conduct that is incompatible with the proper exercise of parental responsibility…’ (151 (e)).

At first glance the code may appear harmless, however, it is necessary to understand that all the concepts of homeland, family, respect for patriot symbols, criminal act, and vicious or corrupt conduct are interpreted within the framework of the socialist system on which the 2019 constitution is founded. However, continuing protests, such as that of 11 July 2021 and other smaller scale social uprisings since then,1 indicate that the population is rejecting the system that the constitution obligates Cuban citizens to defend, even with their life.2

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El Código de Familia de Cuba cumple dos años

El 22 de julio de 2024 se cumplieron dos años desde que la Asamblea Nacional aprobó el Código de Familia de Cuba y, tal como advirtió la CSW, la legislación se ha extendido mucho más allá de la igualdad para la comunidad LGBT+. Aunque este aspecto fue el foco de los esfuerzos del gobierno para alentar el voto por el “sí” en el referendo público que siguió, solo un puñado de los 474 artículos eran relevantes para ese tema.

La aplicación de la legislación ha obligado a familias enteras a emigrar para proteger a sus hijos y no perder la custodia parental, como es una posibilidad real en virtud del artículo 191 del código. La legislación permite que los menores sean transferidos al cuidado del Estado, si los padres no cumplen con las responsabilidades detalladas en el artículo 138 del código, entre ellas “inculcar el amor a la familia, a la patria, el respeto a sus símbolos… las normas de convivencia social [basadas en la ideología del Partido Comunista de Cuba] y el respeto a las autoridades”. Los padres corren riesgo si muestran una conducta que “induzca a su hija o hijo a cometer un acto delictivo…” (191 (c)) y/o “[sean responsables de] una conducta viciosa, corrupta o delictiva que sea incompatible con el debido ejercicio de la responsabilidad parental…” (151 (e)).

A primera vista el código puede parecer inofensivo, sin embargo, es necesario comprender que todos los conceptos de patria, familia, respeto a los símbolos patrios, acto delictivo y conducta viciosa o corrupta se interpretan en el marco del sistema socialista en el que se fundamenta la constitución de 2019. Sin embargo, las continuas protestas, como la del 11 de julio de 2021 y otros levantamientos sociales de menor escala desde entonces,1 indican que la población está rechazando el sistema que la constitución obliga a los ciudadanos cubanos a defender, incluso con su vida.2

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A change in government in Venezuela can only benefit the religious sector

Over the past 11 years of President Nicolas Maduro’s leadership, Venezuelan religious leaders have increasingly practiced a form of self-censorship when it comes to preaching or speaking on topics like social justice, peace, poverty, or any topic that might be perceived negatively by the dictatorship. While they may appear to have imposed this censorship on themselves, it comes from a very real fear having witnessed the cruelty that President Maduro has unleashed against those he and his regime identify as political enemies.

Elections are due to be held on Sunday, 28 July. In the run up, the Maduro regime has dedicated itself to attacking the opposition and creating an environment of terror with warnings of a ‘bloodbath’ and ‘civil war’ if Maduro does not win a third six-year term. It has been heavily implied that he could refuse to recognize the victory of Edmundo González Urrutia, the most popular candidate according to several polls.

In response to Maduro’s threats, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) warned that ‘this type of discourse by the highest authority of the State and the security forces has the effect of intimidating and curtailing the political freedom of the electorate… These actions affect democratic institutions and the freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, as they discourage the political participation of opposition individuals, their electorate, and the general public.’

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Un Cambio de Gobierno en Venezuela podría beneficiar al sector religioso

Durante los últimos 11 años de liderazgo del presidente Nicolás Maduro, los líderes religiosos venezolanos han practicado cada vez más una forma de autocensura en sus predicaciones o discursos sobre temas como la justicia social, la paz, la pobreza, o cualquier tema que pueda ser percibido negativamente por la dictadura. Aunque puede parecer que se han impuesto esta censura a sí mismos, proviene de un temor muy real al haber presenciado la crueldad que el presidente Maduro ha desatado contra aquellos que él y su régimen identifican como enemigos políticos.

Las elecciones se celebrarán el domingo 28 de julio. En el período previo, el régimen de Maduro se ha dedicado a atacar a la oposición y a crear un ambiente de terror con advertencias de un “baño de sangre” y “guerra civil” si Maduro no gana un tercer mandato de seis años. Se ha insinuado fuertemente que podría negarse a reconocer la victoria de Edmundo González Urrutia, el candidato más popular según varias encuestas.

En respuesta a las amenazas de Maduro, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) advirtió que “este tipo de discurso por parte de la máxima autoridad del Estado y las fuerzas de seguridad tiene el efecto de intimidar y coartar la libertad política del electorado… Estas acciones afectan las instituciones democráticas y las libertades de asociación, reunión y expresión, ya que desalientan la participación política de las personas opositoras, de su electorado y de la ciudadanía en general.”

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Where the laws don’t apply: Rural Christian communities in Laos and Mexico face similar challenges

Pastor Mum and five members of his church – Liang, Pa, Laen, Lan and Khoon – have been prisoners in their own village since 22 June. 

The six Christians were arrested by the chief of Tahae village, in Laos’ Khammouane Province, after they held a small church service in Pastor Mum’s home, which was deemed ‘illegal’ as their church is not officially registered. 

It has proven challenging to get updates since – perhaps as to be expected of a small remote village in a rural province in central Laos – however when CSW first reported on the arrests five days after they took place, the group had not been formally charged or permitted to see their families or access legal counsel.  

Continue reading “Where the laws don’t apply: Rural Christian communities in Laos and Mexico face similar challenges”