Every Sunday…

Every Sunday, between 12:30pm and 1pm, Berta Soler Fernández prepares herself.  She and her husband, Ángel Moya Acosta step outside their home, a square, two story building painted red, with a light green porch. They have every intention of making their way to a Roman Catholic Church in the Miramar section of Havana, Cuba. The church is named for Saint Rita of Cascia, the patron saint of abuse, loss, peace, desperate cases and lost causes. They will attend Mass and offer up prayers.  

Berta is dressed all in white. 

Every Sunday, between 12:30pm and 1pm, Berta and Ángel open the door of their home and are met by National Revolutionary Police (NRP) officers and Department of State Security (DSS) agents. Mobs of paramilitary members, some holding signs with offensive and insulting messages, hold up mobile phones as they record the couple’s movements. The two are forced into DSS cars with private license plates and, instead of going to Mass, they are taken to an NRP station. They are ordered to undergo an intrusive medical examination. They refuse because they have not asked for an examination and know that they will not be provided with the results anyway. Those will go to the DSS. Berta and Ángel are then sent to semi-dark prison cells where they will be held until the following morning. They will be taken by car and dropped off near their home, which also serves as the national headquarters for the Ladies in White, a dissident group that has been holding peaceful protests in support of political prisoners since 2003. 

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Cada Domingo…

Cada domingo, entre las 12:30pm y las 13:00pm, Berta Soler Fernández se alista. Ella y su marido, Ángel Moya Acosta, salen de su casa, un edificio cuadrado de dos pisos pintado de rojo, con un porche verde claro. Tienen la intención de dirigirse a una iglesia católica romana en la sección Miramar de La Habana, Cuba. La iglesia lleva el nombre de Santa Rita de Casia, la santa patrona de los casos desesperados, del abuso, de la pérdida, de la paz, y de las causas perdidas. Asistirán a misa y ofrecerán sus oraciones. 

Berta está vestida toda de blanco. 

Cada domingo, entre las 12:30pm y las 13:00pm, Berta y Ángel abren la puerta de su casa y son recibidos por oficiales de la Policía Nacional Revolucionaria (PNR) y agentes del Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (DSE). Multitudes de paramilitares, algunos con carteles con mensajes ofensivos e insultantes, sostienen teléfonos móviles mientras graban los movimientos de la pareja. Los dos son obligados a subir a coches del DSE con matrícula privada y, en lugar de ir a misa, los llevan a una comisaría de la PNR. Les ordenan que se sometan a un examen médico invasivo. Se niegan porque no han pedido el examen y saben que, de todos modos, no les proporcionarán los resultados. Éstos irán al DSE. Berta y Ángel son enviados a celdas penitenciarias semioscuras donde permanecerán retenidos hasta la mañana siguiente. Los llevarán en coche y los dejarán cerca de su casa, que también sirve como sede nacional de las Damas de Blanco, un grupo disidente que lleva realizando protestas pacíficas en apoyo de los presos políticos desde 2003. 

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The Cuban Family Code two years on

22 July 2024 marked two years since the Cuban Family Code was approved by the National Assembly, and, just as CSW warned, the legislation has extended far beyond equality for the LGBT+ community. Although this aspect was the focus of the government’s efforts to encourage a ‘yes’ vote in the public referendum that followed, only a handful of the 474 articles were relevant to that subject.

Implementation of the legislation has pressured entire families into emigrating, to protect their children and not lose parental custody as is a real possibility under Article 191 of the code. The legislation allows for minors to be transferred into the care of the state, if the parents fail to fulfil the responsibilities detailed in Article 138 of the code including ‘inculcating love for the family, for the homeland, respect for its symbols… the norms of social coexistence [based on the ideology of the Cuban Communist Party] and respect for the authorities’.   Parents are at risk if they demonstrate behaviour that ‘induces their daughter or son to commit a criminal act…’ (191 (c)) and/or ‘[are responsible for] vicious, corrupt or criminal conduct that is incompatible with the proper exercise of parental responsibility…’ (151 (e)).

At first glance the code may appear harmless, however, it is necessary to understand that all the concepts of homeland, family, respect for patriot symbols, criminal act, and vicious or corrupt conduct are interpreted within the framework of the socialist system on which the 2019 constitution is founded. However, continuing protests, such as that of 11 July 2021 and other smaller scale social uprisings since then,1 indicate that the population is rejecting the system that the constitution obligates Cuban citizens to defend, even with their life.2

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El Código de Familia de Cuba cumple dos años

El 22 de julio de 2024 se cumplieron dos años desde que la Asamblea Nacional aprobó el Código de Familia de Cuba y, tal como advirtió la CSW, la legislación se ha extendido mucho más allá de la igualdad para la comunidad LGBT+. Aunque este aspecto fue el foco de los esfuerzos del gobierno para alentar el voto por el “sí” en el referendo público que siguió, solo un puñado de los 474 artículos eran relevantes para ese tema.

La aplicación de la legislación ha obligado a familias enteras a emigrar para proteger a sus hijos y no perder la custodia parental, como es una posibilidad real en virtud del artículo 191 del código. La legislación permite que los menores sean transferidos al cuidado del Estado, si los padres no cumplen con las responsabilidades detalladas en el artículo 138 del código, entre ellas “inculcar el amor a la familia, a la patria, el respeto a sus símbolos… las normas de convivencia social [basadas en la ideología del Partido Comunista de Cuba] y el respeto a las autoridades”. Los padres corren riesgo si muestran una conducta que “induzca a su hija o hijo a cometer un acto delictivo…” (191 (c)) y/o “[sean responsables de] una conducta viciosa, corrupta o delictiva que sea incompatible con el debido ejercicio de la responsabilidad parental…” (151 (e)).

A primera vista el código puede parecer inofensivo, sin embargo, es necesario comprender que todos los conceptos de patria, familia, respeto a los símbolos patrios, acto delictivo y conducta viciosa o corrupta se interpretan en el marco del sistema socialista en el que se fundamenta la constitución de 2019. Sin embargo, las continuas protestas, como la del 11 de julio de 2021 y otros levantamientos sociales de menor escala desde entonces,1 indican que la población está rechazando el sistema que la constitución obliga a los ciudadanos cubanos a defender, incluso con su vida.2

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A change in government in Venezuela can only benefit the religious sector

Over the past 11 years of President Nicolas Maduro’s leadership, Venezuelan religious leaders have increasingly practiced a form of self-censorship when it comes to preaching or speaking on topics like social justice, peace, poverty, or any topic that might be perceived negatively by the dictatorship. While they may appear to have imposed this censorship on themselves, it comes from a very real fear having witnessed the cruelty that President Maduro has unleashed against those he and his regime identify as political enemies.

Elections are due to be held on Sunday, 28 July. In the run up, the Maduro regime has dedicated itself to attacking the opposition and creating an environment of terror with warnings of a ‘bloodbath’ and ‘civil war’ if Maduro does not win a third six-year term. It has been heavily implied that he could refuse to recognize the victory of Edmundo González Urrutia, the most popular candidate according to several polls.

In response to Maduro’s threats, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) warned that ‘this type of discourse by the highest authority of the State and the security forces has the effect of intimidating and curtailing the political freedom of the electorate… These actions affect democratic institutions and the freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, as they discourage the political participation of opposition individuals, their electorate, and the general public.’

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