العلاقة بين التطرف و بين قوانين ازدراء الأديان في منطقة الشرق الأوسط و شمال أفريقيا
تحتوي منطقة الشرق الأوسط و شمال أفريقيا على أكبر عدد من البلدان التي تحتوي قوانينها على شكل من أشكال قوانين التجديف أو ازدراء الأديان، حيث يقدر عدد البلدان التي مازالت تطبق هذه القوانين بشكل أو بآخر بتسع و ستين بلدا على مستوى العالم.
و عموماً تعتبر العقوبات المطبقة في هذه الحالات من أكثر العقوبات شدة. ففي إيران مثلا يمكن أن يعاقب أي شخص يتم اتهامه بإهانة الرسول أو أي من أنبياء الإسلام بالإعدام وفقاً للمادة ٢٦٢ من قانون العقوبات. بينما في مصر فإن عقوبة “التحريض على الفرقة الدينية، إهانة أي ديانة سماوية أو أي مذهب تابع لأحدها، أو تهديد الوحدة الوطنية” قد تصل إلى خمس سنوات وفقاً للمادة الثامنة و التسعين من قانون العقوبات.
تعريف قوانين التجديف أو ازدراء الأديان:
قوانين التجديف هي مواد قانونية مهمتها تجريم أية أفعال أو أقوال أو كتابات أو أعمال فنية يتم اعتبارها مهينة لديانة أو معتقد ما أو لشخصيات مقدسة أو جارحة للمشاعر الدينية. تعاقب قوانين ازدراء الأديان أيضاً أية أفعال من شأنها تدنيس الأماكن الدينية و تعطيل العبادات و الطقوس الدينية.
Continue reading “The relationship between blasphemy laws and religious extremism in the Middle East and North Africa (Arabic)”
While an estimated 69 countries across the globe possess blasphemy laws of some kind, no geographical region has as many countries with such laws as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Furthermore, in many of these countries the penalties for committing the ‘crime’ of blasphemy are among the most severe.
In Iran, for example, anyone who insults the ‘Great Prophet … or any of the Great Prophets’ of Islam can be sentenced to death under Article 262 of the Penal Code. In Egypt, the crime of “inciting strife, ridiculing or insulting a heavenly religion or a sect following it, or damaging national unity” is punishable by up to five years imprisonment under Article 98(f) of the Penal Code.
What are blasphemy laws?
Blasphemy laws criminalise actions, often emitted in speech, writing or art deemed defamatory to a certain religion, offensive against religious figures or harmful to religious feelings. They also criminalise actions such as the disruption of religious services and the desecration of religious sites.
Continue reading “The relationship between blasphemy laws and religious extremism in the Middle East and North Africa”
On 18 November 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a former defence secretary and brother of two-term president Mahinda Rajapaksa, was sworn in as Sri Lanka’s eighth president. Representing the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) the Sinhalese-Buddhist Nationalist Party, Gotabaya received just over 52% of the vote.
Despite his apparent popularity, he is nevertheless a divisive figure in Sri Lankan politics. During his time as defence secretary from 2005 to 2015 he was accused of committing grave human rights violations and war crimes, including the establishment of military death squads, whilst simultaneously being praised by others for his part in overseeing the end of the long running civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government.
Support for Gotabaya came almost exclusively from Sinhalese-Buddhist areas in the south of Sri Lanka. He struggled to win votes in the north and east of the country where the majority of Sri Lanka’s Tamils and Muslims are based.
Continue reading “The Rajapaksas’ return to power means an uncertain future for Sri Lankan minorities”
“It is all of our worst fears realised … Sri Lanka is totally polarised by this result” –Hilmy Ahmed, vice-president of the Sri Lanka Muslim Council.
Although Turkey’s constitution defines the country as a secular state, it
is caught between its secular and Islamic identities. The current government
has publicly endorsed a move towards a Sunni Muslim identity for the country,
conflating religious and national identities, by combining the religious
nationalism propagated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP) with the secular Nationalist Movement Party
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, or MHP)’s ideology of ‘ultra-nationalism,’ which
is defined as “extreme nationalism that promotes the interests of one state or
people above all others.”
Such incitement is visible in a variety of areas ranging from education and employment, to religious practices and day-to-day administrative procedures. There has also been a surge in the expression of anti-Semitism and anti-Christian sentiments in pro-government media.
Continue reading “Turkey under Erdogan: Caught between secular and Islamic identities”
When the official results confirming the re-election of Joko Widodo as President of Indonesia were announced on 21 May, supporters of his rival, former General Prabowo Subianto, took to the streets. Riots led to carnage in the capital, Jakarta, with at least six people dead. The divisions unleashed by the election campaign were exposed in their ugliest form.
point, Indonesia’s elections had been peaceful and orderly, despite what almost
all observers describe as the most divisive campaign in the country’s recent
history. On 17 April, over 190 million people cast their votes for the
presidency and the national, regional and local legislatures, in one of the
world’s biggest and most complex democratic exercises in recent times. To
conduct such a poll, in the world’s third largest democracy and fourth most
populous nation, across the world’s largest archipelago of 17,508 islands
stretching from the Indian to the Pacific Oceans, is a significant feat.
I spent three weeks in Indonesia during the election period. I witnessed the final week of the campaign, election day itself, and the first twelve days after the elections. I travelled to four cities – Jakarta, Medan in North Sumatra, Surabaya in East Java, and Pontianak in West Kalimantan – where I met civil society activists, religious communities and government advisers. I left Indonesia with profoundly mixed feelings.
Continue reading “Indonesia’s elections reveal a nation at the crossroads between pluralism and intolerance”